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Green v. Commonwealth
580 S.E.2d 834 (Va. 2003)
.Facts
On Friday, August 21,1998, Kevin Green ("Green") entered a grocerystore
owned by Patricia L. Vaughan ("Mrs. Vaughan") and her husband Lawrence T.
Vaughan ("Mr. Vaughan"). On Fridays, the Vaughans routinely withdrew large
sums of cash from the bank and brought it to the grocery store in order to cash
checks for employees of local businesses. Green worked for a nearby lumber
companyand often cashed his weeklypaychecks at the Vaughans' grocery store.
On the day in question, Green entered the grocery store with another man and
began shooting. After firing four shots, Green stood as a lookout while his
accomplice grabbed the bank bag and exited the store. Green walked over to
Mrs. Vaughan and shot her three more times before leaving the store. An
autopsy revealed that Mrs. Vaughan died after susta four gunshot wounds,
three of which were lethal The police searched Green's home and recovered six
bullets from a tree trunk on his property. Forensic testing revealed that the
bullets found at Green's home were fired from the same gun used to shoot Mrs.
Vaughan. Green was arrested and confessed to the robbery and shooting.!
Green was convicted of the capital murder of Mrs. Vaughan and sentenced
to death.2 In June 2001 the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Green's convic-
tion and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial on the capital
murder charge.' On remand, Green was again convicted of capital murder in the
commission of a robberyunder Virginia Code section 18.2- 31(4)." At the penalty
phase of Green's trial, several correctional officers testified that Green often
exhibited disruptive and threatening behavior.' An acquaintance of Green,
Clement Leon Cleaton ("Cleaton"), testified that Green had previously threat-
ened to rob and kill him.6 Cleaton also claimed to have heard Green threaten to
1. Green v. Commonwealth, 580 S.E2d 834, 837-39 (Va. 2003).
2. See Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E2d 446, 447 (Va. 2001). SwgamvulyDamien P.
DeLaney, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 145 (2001) (analyzing Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.Eld
446 (Va. 2001)).
3. G 546 S.E.2d at 452. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to seat impartial jurors. Id at 451.
4. w 580 S.E.2d at 837; s&VA. CODE ANN. $ 18.2-31(4) c"he Supp. 2003) (defmiag
[t]he wMful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or
attempted robbery" as capital murder).
5. Gtw; 580 S.E.2d at 839.
6. Id
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rob an ice cream vendor7 As mitigating evidence, Dr. Jack Daniel ("Dr. Daniel")
testified that there was no evidence that Mrs. Vaughan endured prolonged
suffering before dying from the gunshot wounds.8 Dr. Scott Sautter ("Dr.
Sautter"), a neuropsychologist, testified that Green exhibited a low level of
intellectual functioning but also that he would not be a danger to others in a
maximnium-securitysetting.9 Two clinical psychologists testified for the Common-
wealth that Green exhibited "low average" mental functioning and posed a low
risk of violence in a prison setting.'
The jury found both the future dangerousness and vileness predicates
satisfied, and the Circuit Court for Brunswick County sentenced Green to
death." Green appealed his capital murder conviction to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which consolidated Green's appeal with the automatic review of his
death sentence under Virginia Code section 17.1-313(F). 2
I. Hdding
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion bydenying Green an investigator.3 The court also found that it was
not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to refuse to allow Green to ask
seven of his fifty-two voir dire questions. 4 The court found no manifest error
in the circuit court's decision to excuse a potential juror for cause." Finally, the
7. Id
8. id
9. Id at 839-40. Dr. Sautter used two tests to assess Green's I.Q., the "Wechsler abbrevi-
ated intelligence scale" and the "Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised." Id at 839. The
abbreviated test revealed that Green had an I.Q. of fifty-five, while the other test revealed that
Green had a full-scale I.Q. of seventy-four. Id Dr. Sautter also concluded that in a less secure
environment Green "would be susceptible to harm from other people because of his limited
capacity for communication." Id at 840.
10. Id at 840. The prosecution's psychologists found that Green had an I.Q. of eightyfour
on the "Ammons & Ammons quick test" and that Green had a full-scale I.Q. of seventyfour on
the "Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale." Id
11. Gm3; 580 S.E2d at 837; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Mlichie 2000) (stating that "a
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall... find that there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing serious threat to society"); VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.4(C) (Mlchie Supp. 2003) (stating
that death maybe imposed upon a finding that the defendant's "conduct in committing the offense
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind or aggravated battery to the victim").
12. Gnt, 580 SXE.2d at 837; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(F) (vfichie 2003) (stating that
"[slentence review shall be in addition to appeals, if taken, and review and appeal may be consoli-
dated").
13. &w; 580 S.E2d at 841.
14. Id at 843.
15. Id at 844-45.
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court held that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish premedita-
tion and that Green's death sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate
to similar death penalty cases.16
III. Anzbsis
A. Appdn 'r njI  s rtor
Green argued that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for an
investigator." He claimed that an investigator was necessaryto assist his defense
because he lacked investigative resources and his counsel lacked training in
criminal investigation." On appeal, Green argued "that the 'imbalance' resulting
fromhis lack of investigative resources as compared to the Commonwealth's vast
resources violated his equal protection and due process rights as well as his Sixth
Amendment right to counseL"' 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that defendants, even those charged
with capital murder, do not have an absolute right to an investigator." To obtain
the assistance of an investigator a defendant " 'must show a particularized need'
" by establishing" 'that the services of an expert would materially assist him in
the preparation of his defense and that the denial of such services would result
in a fundamentallyunfair trial'. 2' InBa/eyu Camru t, 2' the defendant, like
Green, claimed that an investigator was necessary to locate witnesses and data
and to evaluate testimony and documents.23 The court found that Baileydid not
adequately demonstrate a particularized need.24 To establish a particularized
need, defendants must demonstrate more than a "mere hope" that an expert
could obtain evidence favorable to the defense." The Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Green failed to establish a particularized need for the appointment of
16. Id at 847, 850.
17. Id at 840.
18. Id
19. G, 580 S.E.2d at 840.
20. Id; see Bailey v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 570, 578 (Va. 2000) (stating that the court
has "consistently rejected the contention that defendants, even in capital murder cases, have an
indiscriminate entitlement to the assistance of an investigator").
21. Gw; 580 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting Husske v. Commonwealh, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-26
(Va. 1996)). The court stated that "[t]he determination whether a defendant has made an adequate
showing of particularized need for expert assistance lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court." Id
22. 529 S.E2d 570 (Va. 2000).
23. Gnr 580 S.E.2d at 840; Bade); 529 S.E.2d at 578.
24. Ga7 580 S.E.2d. at 840-41 (citing B44 529 S.Eld at 578).
25. Id at 841 (quoting Huske, 476 S.E.2d at 925).
2003]
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an investigator. 6 Therefore, the court held that the circuit court's decision to
deny Green's motion was not an abuse of discretion."
B. Vilenes
Green argued that the circuit court erred by denying his pre-trial motion
challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence." Green claimed
that the prosecution's evidence establishing the vileness predicate was insufficient
as a matter of law.29 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that Virginia has no
process for making pre-trial determinations of sufficiency in criminal cases.3
Rather, courts must base sufficiencydeterminations on evidence contained in the
trial record." The court found sufficient evidence in the record supporting the
jury's determination that the vileness factor was satisfied. 2 Thus, the court held
that the circuit court properly denied Green's pre-trial motion.33
C (JvW fVe
Green also argued that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for a
change of venue." Green moved for a change of venue prior to trial and the
circuit court took the motion under advisement.3" Defense counsel did not
object to the court's decision.36 At the end of the penalty phase, the court noted
that it considered the motion denied at the time the jury was empaneled.37 The
Commonwealth argued that the circuit court's order denying the motion was
proper because Green did not renew his motion at the completion of voir dire
or prior to the jury being empaneled and sworn.3  In addition, the Common
26. Id
27. Id The court rejected Green's Sixth Amendment argument citing its decision in Lenz
v. Conmonweath, 544 SE.2d 299,305 (Va. 2001). Id at 841 n.4.
28. Id at 841.
29. Id





35. Id Green submitted newspaper articles, affidavits, and a surveyin support of his motion
for a change of venue. Id
36. Giw, 580 SXE.2d at 841.
37. Id
38. Id After the qualification of twentyfour jurors, Green's counsel indicated to the court
that there were no preliminary matters to be addressed before the jurywas brought in. Id Again,
after the parties completed their peremptory strikes, Green's counsel responded in the affirmative
when the court asked, "[Ils that your jy?. " Id "At no time did Green's counsel ask the court to
rule on the motion for a change of venue previouslytaken under advisement or renew that motion"
[Vol. 16:1
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wealth argued that Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25 barred Green frompresent-
ing a change of venue claim.3 Green argued that the change of venue issue was
not waived and that the court was aware that the motion was pending.4
In Hake vuCamw ld, 4' the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to con-
sider a similar change of venue argument.42 The defendant in Hake agreed to
continue his change of venue motion and then failed to renew the motion." On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to consider Hoke's challenge
because he failed to renew his motion at trial." In the present case, the court
recognized that Green never agreed to continue his motion, but noted that he
failed to object to the circuit court's decision to take the motion under advise-
ment.45  Because Green also failed to renew his motion before the jury was
empaneled, the court found that he "implicitly consented to the seating of the
jury."4 Green failed to give the court anyindication that he wished to pursue the
change of venue motion."7 Defense counsel essentially waived the motion by
accepting the jury.48 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to find error
in the circuit court's denial of Green's change of venue claim.
49
D. Jwr Qerrctw
Green argued that the circuit court erred by denyng his request to submit
a juror questionnaire.m Although Green indicated at the pre-trial hearing that he
would file a motion and sample questionnaire, he failed to do so. The Supreme
Id at 841-42.
39. Id at 841; sewVA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25 (stating that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling
of the trial court or the commission before which the case was initially tried unless the objection
was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to
enable this Court to attain the ends of justice").
40. Ghv4 580 SX.2d at 842. In support of his argument that the court was aware that the
motion was still pending, Green pointed to evidence in support of his motion which was submitted
prior to voir dire. Id
41. 377 S.E.2d 595 (Va. 1989).
42. Gn& 580 S.E2d at 842; Hoke v. Commonwealth, 377 SE.2d 595, 597 (Va. 1989).
43. Gm 580 S.E.2d at 842 (citing Hke, 377 S.E2d at 597).
44. Id (citing Hkg 377 S.E2d at 597).
45. Id
46. id; see Thomas v. Gommonwealh, 559 S1.2d 652, 659-61 (Va. 2002) (stating that the
trial court's refusal to grant a change of venue motion should be reversed because the dfendant
appropriately renewed the motion after voir dire).
47. &w4 580 S.E2d at 842.
48. Id
49. Id; sw VA. SUP. Cr. K. 5:25 (setting forth the circumstances under which the Supreme
Court of Virginia will assign error to a trial court's ruling).




Court of Virginia found no evidence in the record showing that the defense made
any argument in support of a motion for a jury questionnaire. 2 Therefore, the
court held that Green was barred from presenting this claim for the first time on
appeal under Rule 5:25.Y3 In addition, the court stated that it had previously
"held that the use of a juror questionnaire outside the courtroom would under-
mine the value derived from a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate
prospective jurors first hand."-' The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the
circuit court did not abuse its discretion regarding the juror questionnaire claim"5
E. Vc&DeQum
On appeal, Green argued that the circuit court erred by preventing the
defense from asking seven of its fifty-two voir dire questions.8' The Supreme
Court of Virginia found that the seven questions were too general and were" 'an
invitation to a rambling discourse on a broad range of emotions.' " The court
stated that " 'trial courts are not required to allow counsel to ask questions which
are so ambiguous as to render the answer meaningless.'"" Rather, "voir dire
questions must relate to the four statutory factors of relationship, interest,
opinion, or prejudice." 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that Green
had adequate opportunity to assess whether the jurors could "stand indifferent
in the cause." A trial court's decision to limit voir dire questions will not
generally be reversed if the defense was able to assess the impartialityof the jury
through other questions. 1 The circuit court reassured the defense that the
court's voir dire would cover some of the issues contained in the disallowed
questions.62 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the circuit
52. Id
53. 1d; seeVA. SuP. Cr. R. 5:25 (discussing procedural default).
54. Gw; 580 S.E2d at 843 (citing Stricer v. Commonwealth, 404 S.Ed 227, 234 (Va.
1991) (discussing the effect of juror questionnaires on voir dire)).
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id (quoting Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 757,765 (Va. 1989)).
58. Id (quoting Budhnr 384 S.E.2d at 764).
59. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. S 8.01-358 (Mfichie 2000) (stating that "counsel for either party
shall have the right to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror... to ascertain
whether he is related to either party, or has anyinterest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any
opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein").
60. Gw; 580 S.E.2d at 843 (quoting S 8.01-358).
61. Id; see Budwma, 384 S.E2d at 764 (stating that when a "trial court affords ample
opportuniryto counsel to ask relevant questions and where the questions actuallypropounded by
the trial court were sufficient to preserve a defendant's right to trial by a fair and impartial jury, we
will generally not reverse a trial court's decision to limit or disallow certain questions from defense
counsel").
62. Gw; 380 SE.2d at 843. The circuit court stated that counsel might be allowed to ask
[Vol. 16:1
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Green contended that it was error for the circuit court to excuse a prospec-
tive juror for cause. 4 During voir dire, juror Williams stated that he did not
know if he could find someone guilty knowing that the death penalty could be
imposed.65 In response to questions bydefense counsel, juror Williams indicated
that he would be able to do his duty as a juror.66 However, juror Williams
responded to the Commonwealth's line of questioning by stating that he could
not vote for the death penalty.67 The circuit court granted the Commonwealth's
follow-up questions depending on the juror's responses to the court's questions. Id
63. Id
64. Id at 844.
65. Id Juror Williams revealed that his cousin had been sentenced to life imprisonment for
murder and that this fact might affect his ability to make a decision in Green's case. I
66. Id The following exchange took place between Green's counsel and juror Williams:
Q. In this particular case, are you wiling if called as a juror to listen to all of the
evidence at the trial and then at the sentencing, and then come up with a decision as
to whether to vote death or life imprisonmenit Are you wli to do that as your
duty, your civic duty as a juror'
A. I don't want to, but I'll do it.
Q. But you will?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you can come up with a decision.
A. I think I can.
Id
67. Id The exchange between the Commonwealth and juror Williams went as follows:
Q. Mr. Williams, I want you to look at Mr. Green there.
(The prospective juror complied)
All right. With what you have told us, could you under any circumstances vote to give
him .the death penal? I knowit puts you on the spot and I apologize for it, but under
any cicumstances, could you vote to give him te death penayt?
A. Right now? I mean, right now, no.
Q. I understand that. Can y .u m any is there any (sic] amount of evidence that





motion to strike juror Williams due to his "equivocal answers about whether he
could render a guilty verdict in a case involving the death penalty."
61
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "[a] prospective juror is properly
excused for cause when that person's views concerning the death penaltywould
substantiallyimpair or preclude the performance of his or her dutyin accordance
with the court's instructions and the juror's oath."69 The court accorded defer-
ence to the circuit court's decision because the circuit court's determination was
based on firsthand observation of the juror's responses.' In reviewing the
record, the Supreme Court of Virgina agreed with the circuit court's decision to
excuse juror Williams for cause.1 After a determination that there was no
manifest error, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
At trial, Green argued that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient
to prove premeditation. 3 After the Commonwealth presented its case, defense
counsel moved to strike the capital murder evidence on the ground that it failed
to show that Mrs. Vaughan's murder was "willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated."74 The circuit court denied Green's motion after finding that Green
entered the store and "said nothing before shooting; that he killed, wounded and
then robbed, and that he did not bother to wear a mask which he had pre-
pared."" On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Green argued that the
circuit court erred by denying his motion.76
The court found that the evidence regarding Mrs. Vaughan's shooting was
sufficient to prove premeditation." 7 The court explained that "[p]remeditation
is an intent to kill that needs to exist only for a moment.""8 Premeditation is
68. Gnw, 580 S.El2d at 844.
69. Id at 845 (citing Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 547 S.E2d 186,195 (Va. 2001) and Bamabei
v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E2d 270,277 (Va. 1996)).
70. Id (citing Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 875 (Va. 2000)).
71. Id Juror Williams never indicated that he would be able to listen to the evidence and
decide whether to vote for life 'mrisonment or the death penalty. Id The Supreme Court of
Virginia found that this subs ilyimpaireld the juror's abilityto perform his dutyin accordance
with the court's instructions. Id
72. Id at 844 (citing Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254,262 (Va. 1991) (stating that
the exclusion of prospective jurors will not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error)).
73. Id at 847.
74. Gw 580 S.E.2d at 847. Green based his motion on a statement he made to police





78. Id (citingPetersonv. Commonwealh, 302 S.E.2d 520,524 (Va. 1983));seealsoGiarratano
[Vol. 16:1
GREEN V COMMONWEALTH
generally a factual issue which is reviewed "in the light most favorable to the
prevailing partybelow."79 The facts of the shooting demonstrate that Green shot
Mrs. Vaughan without warning, and then he walked over to where she lay and
shot her two more times."0 The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the facts




Green made a motion at trial to strike the Commonwealth's evidence
regarding the vileness predicate. 2 He claimed that the Commonwealth did not
prove an aggravated battery to the victim or that he exhibited depravity of
mind. 3 As support for his motion, Green pointed to forensic evidence that
showed that three of Mrs. Vaughan's gunshot wounds were lethal.84 Thus, he
claimed that Mrs. Vaughan died almost instantaneously without suffering any
other battery.8 On appeal, Green argued that the circuit court erred bydenying
his motion. 6
An aggravated batteryis " 'a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively,
is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.'
"7 The court disagreed with Green's interpretation of the forensic evidence
presented at trial.88 The forensic pathologist testified that he was unable to
determine the order in which the four shots were fired at Mrs. Vaughan. 9 The
evidence showed that it was possible that the gunshot wound to Mrs. Vaughan's
v. Commonweakh, 266 S.E2d 94, 100 (Va. 1980) (A design to kill maybe formed onlya moment
before the fatal act is committed provided the accused had time to think and did intend to kill");
Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 S.Eld 28, 33 (Va. 1975) (stating that the intention to kill need not
exist for any specified length of time prior to the actual kling).
79. Gen4 580 S.E.2d at 847; see aoza v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 273, 279 (Va. 1984)
(stating that "[tihe question whether a defendant is guiky of a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of the victim is usually a question for the jury to determine from all the facts and circum-
stances").
80. Gwi, 580 S.E.2d at 847.
81. Id; see Remington v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 620, 632 (Va. 2001) (stating that
stabbing a victim eight to ten times constitutes premeditation).
82. &w; 580 S.E.2d at 848.
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id In addition, Green noted the forensic pathologist's testimonythat Mrs. Vaughan died
within "seconds to minutes" of the first shot. Id
86. Id
87. Id at 848 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978)).




chest was fired first, causing her to feel like she was suffocating?' The court
reiterated its position that" 'a] killing inflicted by multiple gunshot wounds..
.when there is an appreciable lapse of time between the first shot and the last,
and when death does not result instantaneously from the first' constitutes an
'aggravated battery.' "91 Further, the court stated that multiple fatal gunshot
wounds constitute an aggravated battery.2
In addition, the court defined depravity of mind as " 'a degree of moral
turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of
ordinary legal malice and premeditation.' "9' The court found that Green's
actions, specifically the repeated shooting of Mrs. Vaughan in front of her
husband, displayed sufficient depravityof mind.94 Therefore, the Supreme Court
of Virginia determined that the circuit court properlydismissed Green's motion
to strike the Commonwealth's evidence regarding vileness."
2. Fmtwe Dx rmness
Green argued that the circuit court erred bydenying his motion to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence regarding the future dangerousness predicate.' He
claimed that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he would commit violent
criminal acts in the future and that he posed a serious threat to society.9 First,
Green argued that the testimony of Dr. Sautter and Dr. Pasquale indicated that
he posed no serious threat if confined in a prison setting. Second, Green noted
his lack of prior convictions as evidence against the Commonwealth's assertion
that he constituted a future danger to society? Finally, Green argued that his
unadjudicated prior bad acts were " 'benign' run-ins with friends, family and
employers." 1°
90. Id
91. Id (quoting Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (Va. 1995)).
92. Id (citing Walkerv. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (Va. 1999) (stating that multiple
gunshot wounds establish an aggravated batteyh).
93. Id (quoting Sni., 248 S.E.2d at 149).
94. Gms 580 S.E.2d at 848. The court further stated that Green's conduct showed that he
had no mercy for Mrs. Vaughan when he shot her without anyprovocation as she lay on the floor.
id at 848-49.
95. Id at 849.
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id Dr. Sautter testified that Green would exhibit appropriate behavior if confined in a
maximum-securitysetting. Id Dr. Pasquale testified that Green posed onlya low risk of misbehav-
ior if confined to prison. Id
99. Id
100. Gm7n 580 S.E.2d at 848.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Green's arguments and found that
the circumstances of the murder were sufficient to establish that Green posed a
future danger to society.101 In making its decision, the court relied on various
testimonythat indicated Green's future dangerousness. °2 Green's acquaintance,
Cleaton, testified that Green threatened to kill and rob him.' 3 The court also
considered the testimony given by correctional officers who interacted with
Green."° The officers testified that Green exhibited disruptive behavior while
incarcerated and made numerous threats to the officers.'0 s Thus, the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's refusal to strike the Common-
wealth's evidence regarding Green's future dangerousness.'06
I. IssuesAllradyDdidd
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "[s]everal of Green's assignments
of error concern issues that this [c]ourt has already decided adversely to the
position he... advances."' Green failed to put forth anyreasons whythe court
should depart from its previous rulings.'O' Therefore, the court followed prece-
dent and denied Green's assignments of error concerning specific issues.""
1. Bil cfPamadan
Green claimed that the circuit court erred byoverruling his motion for a bill
of particulars."' The circuit court initiallygranted Green's motion in part."' On
appeal, Green argued "that he was entitled to a bill of particulars providing a
'narrowing' construction of the 'vileness' predicate and listing all the evidence
that the Commonwealth intended to rely upon at sentencing.""' The Supreme
Court of Virginia held, based on precedent, that Green was not entitled to such
a broad bill of particulars.'" The Virginia Capital Case aearinghouse has a
101. Id at 849; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(Q (Mflchie Supp. 2003) (stating that future
dangerousness can be based on the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense").















somewhat different motion for a bill of particulars which may avoid the applica-
tion of precedent cited in Gmn'i
4
2. Un4iazv. A ds
Green also argued that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to
prevent the Commonwealth from presenting evidence of Green's unadjudicated
acts at sentencing. " ' The circuit court overruled Green's motion but stated that
each unadjudicated act would be reviewed bythe court to determine its relevance
to future dangerousness. 6 The court also stated that it would consider the
probative value and the possible prejudicial effect of such evidence."' The
Supreme Court of Virginia cited previous cases in which it rejected the same
argument."' Therefore, the court affirmed its prior holdings and denied Green's
claim.'
119
3. CMn*iMu ef Caovweai
Green made a motion at trial to introduce evidence regarding the confine-
ment conditions of life imprisonment.2  The circuit court overruled Green's
motion to present such evidence in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's future
dangerousness evidence.' The court noted that Green's motion was denied
only "to the extent that it exceeds evidence of [Green's] previous adjustment to
incarceration.""' The Supreme Court of Virginia cited precedent in support of
the circuit court's decision and affirmed the ruling."'
1. MmdatyReew
1. PassionorPrehjzd
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 17.1-313(Q(1), the Supreme Court of
Virginia must consider and determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was
114. Please contact the Vrgina Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557 for a motion
for a bill of particulars relating to the vileness aggravator.




119. Id (citing Walke, 515 S.E2d at 571-73, Williams v. Commonwealth, 450 SE..2d 365,371
(Va. 1994), and Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196,206 (Va. 1991)).
120. Id at 849-50.
121. Gw% 580 S.E.2d at 849-50.
122. Id at 850.
123. Id (citing Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 SXE2d 695, 713 (Va. 2002), Bums v. Common-
wealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 892-93 (Va. 2001), Luzr, 537 S.E.2d at 879, and Chaerrix v. Common-
wealth, 513 SYE.2d 642,653-54 (Va. 1999)).
284 [Vol. 16:1
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imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary
factor." 24 In this case, Green did not argue that passion or prejudice affected his
sentence."' After reviewing the trial record, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found no evidence that either the jury's decision or the circuit court's decision
was influenced by such factors. 2
2. PTptiiiniitRezew
Under Virginia Code section 17.1-313(Q (2), the Supreme Court of Virginia
is required to address whether a defendant's death sentence is "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant."" 7 The statute also requires the court to compare the
case before it with "similar cases."' The Supreme Court of Virginia compared
Green's case to other death penalty cases involving a murder committed n
the commission of a robberyin which the jury found both aggravating factors.2
The court stated that the proportionality review included all capital cases re-
viewed by the court rather than just a selection of specific cases.' 0 After con-
ducting the proportionality review, the court concluded that Green's death
sentence was "not excessive or disproportionate to sentences generallyimposed"
in Virginia for capital murders similar to the murder of Mrs. Vaughan. '
Green argued that his death sentence was excessive because Mrs. Vaughan
did not endure prolonged suffering and because he did not have prior criminal
convictions.' In other words, Green claimed that his case involved "less aggra-
vation" than other death penalty cases in Virginia.' The Supreme Court of
Virginia rejected Green's argument and reiterated that proportionality review is
meant " 'to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposi-
tion of the death penalty,'" and not to " 'insure complete symmetry. ""'
124. Id; seVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(1) (lichie 2003) (stating that reviewing a death
sentence requires that "the court shall consider and determine ... [w]hether the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbirry factor").
125. Gw; 580 S.E.2d at 850.
126. Id
127. Id (quoting S 17.1-313(Q(2)).
128. Id (quoting S 17.1-313(Q(2)).
129. Id
130. Id
131. Gm 580 S.E.2d at 850 (citing Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674 (Va. 2000),
Stout v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 288 (Va. 1989), Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815
(Va. 1985), and Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E2d 807 (Va. 1985)).
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id (quoting Orbe v. Commonweakh, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (Va. 1999)).
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IV. Appiaim in Vi%*a
A. Pr-trideewnim
In GC the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that Virginia does not have
procedures for pre-trial determinations of sufficiencyof evidence."' The court
stated that it "must determine the sufficiency of [the Commonwealth's] evidence
based on the record made at trial."" 6 However, Virginia Supreme Court Rule
3A.9(b) (2) states that "anydefense or objection that is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be raised by motion before trial."" 7
When the Commonwealth's evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, is necessarilyinadequate to support a verdict, trial of the general
issue is not necessary. For example, Virginia law is absolutely clear that the use
of force or intimidation to retain previously stolen property is not robbery.
13 1 If
the Commonwealth has charged capital murder predicated on robbery and its
best evidence will show larceny followed by force or intimidation, a motion
under 3Ak9(b)(2) is appropriate.3 9 The motion should be granted to strike the
capital aspect of the indictment."4 Similarly, if capital mr-der is charged in a case
involving only a single, distant-range gunshot, the Commonwealth will not be
able to prove vileness.' 4' A motion under Rule 3A-9(b)(2) to strike vileness
would be appropriate here. The use of Rule 3A.9(b)(2) can be facilitated byex
parte hearings. For example, capital defense attomeys seeking to strike "vile-
ness" pre-trial might suggest that the Commonwealth make an ex parte showing
135. Id at 841.
136. Id
137. VA. Sup. Cr. R. 3A9(b)(2) (discussing the defenses and objections that may be raised
before trial).
138. SeJones v. Commonwealth, 574 S.E.2d 767,769 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (finding the facts
insufficient to support a robbery charge where the defendant took a pair of boots from a store and
threatened a clerk with a gun in the parking lot when confronted bythe clerk); Mason v. Common-
wealth, 105 S.E.2d 149, 151 (Va. 1958) ("The violence or putting in fear, to constitute the essential
element in robbery, must precede... the taking of the property .... No violence... resorted to
merely for the purpose of retaining a possession aireadyacquired, or to effect escape, will... supply
the element of force or intimidation . .
139. VA.SUP.CT.R. 3A-9(b)(2);seVA.G0DEANN. S 18.2-31(4) (fichieSupp.2003) (defining
capital murder as "[t]he willful deliberate, and premeditated killing of anyperson in the commission
of robbery or attempted robbery').
140. SeeCommonwealth v. Bunn, CR94000306 (Grcuit Court, Henrico County, 1994) (ruling
that Bunn's larcenywas completed prior to the homicide and striking pre-trial the capital aspect of
the indictment).
141. See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E2d 422, 437 (Va. 1985) (stating that "[ain
aggravated battery is not proven where the evidence shows that the victim died almost instanta-
neously from a sin gunshot wound"); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 525 (Va.
1983) (stating that "[a] death sentence based on vileness is not supponed bythe evidence where the
victim died almost instantaneously from a single gunshot wound"); sivaso Godfreyv. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (finding vileness absent where the "victims were killed instantaneousy).
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of its best evidence and waive their presence to allow the Commonwealth to
present its "vileness" evidence to the judge. If the Commonwealth is unable to
show sufficient evidence establishing the "vileness" aggravating factor, the judge
can make a determination before trial of the general issue.
B. CIFejVme
The Supreme Court of Virginia refused to consider Green's challenge to the
denial of his change of venue motion.42 The court's decision was based on
Green's failure to renew his motion after the jury was selected and before it was
sworn.1 ' 7 w v Caornryvazh" is instructive.4  The defense in Thcmz
renewed its motion for a change of venue at the appropriate time and avoided
procedural default.1" But, it is not enough simply to renew the motion. The
grounds for the renewed motion must be stated with particularity lest the defen-
dant be procedurally defaulted on a viable, but unstated, ground."' If the
renewed motion for change of venue is denied, counsel should object to the
swearing of the juryand state with particularitythat the objection is based on the
same reason(s) supporting the renewed motion.14
C Juy Qz tzc U
The Supreme Court of Virginia barred Green from presenting his jury
questionnaire claim for the first time on appeal14 9 Virginia Supreme Court Rule
5:25 states that "[e]rror will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court ...
unless the objection was stated with reasonable certaintyat the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of jus-
tice."" Although Green stated his intention to move for a questionnaire at a
142. Gan 580 S.E2d at 842.
143. Id
144. 559 S.E.2d 652 (Va. 2002).
145. See Ylxim, 559 S.E2d at 661 (holding that the trial court improperlydenied the defen-
dant's change of venue motion).
146. See id at 659 (stating that the defense renewed its change of venue motion following voir
dire).
147. SRinerv. Commonwealth, 579 SX.2d 671, 682 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the
defendant's "ease of selection" claims were procedurally barred because he failed to object specifi-
cally to the standard applied to his change of venue motion at triaD.
148. SwSpencerv. Commonwealth, 384 S.E2d 785,793 (Va. 1989) (stating thatwhen"aparty
objects to rulings made during the voir dire of a prospective juror, but subsequently fails to object
to the seating of that juror, the party has waived the voir dire objections," and that the grounds for
such objections must be "stated with sufficient specificiy").
149. Gn 580 S.El.d at 843.
150. VA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25.
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pre-trial hearing, he never filed a motion or submitted a sample questionnaire.'
The Supreme Court of Viginia required that Green at leastproffer a question-
naire in order to prevent the procedural default of the claim.S2 Attorneys should
preserve such issues bysubmitting sample questionnaires or bypresenting an oral
or written argument in support of the motion."5 3 In addition, the court in Gren
suggested that juror questionnaires detract from "a trial court's opportunity to
observe and evaluate prospective jurors" during voir dire."4 In actuality, juror
questionnaires serve as screening devices and are a useful starting point for more
directed voir dire.
D. Jwror Willian
During the Commonwealth's questioning of juror Williams, the Common-
wealth asked whether he would be able to "vote" for the death penalty."5
Attorneys should object to voir dire questions which force jurors to state conclu-
sively whether they can vote for death. According to Wainunt v Wma29 and
.W /irv,5 the relevant inquiryis whether a juror can amider both life
and death.' Capital defense attorneys should recognize that questions that
require jurors to state whether they could "vote" for death are inherently objec-
tionable."' Rather than asking whether a juror could "vote" for death, attorneys
should attempt to limit the Commonwealth's inquiry to whether the juror is
willing to consider imposing life imprisonment or death.
E. FuehreDarqns
1. Prior CLVai
In the analysis of Green's future dangerousness challenge, the Supreme
Court of Virinia reiterated that the circumstances surrounding the murder alone




155. Id at 844.
156. 469 US. 412 (1985).
157. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
158. Seainwright v. Wirt, 469 US. 412,424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 US. 38,
45 (1980) (holding that "the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be
excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment... is whether the juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath' ")); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 US. 510,522 n.21 (1968) (stating
that veniremen must "be willing to omidWall of the penalties provided bystate law, and that he not
be irrevocablycommitted, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penaltyof death regardless
of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings*).
159. Se Wamhnpoap 391 US. at 522 n.21 (stating that a juror must consider imposing all of
the penalties provided by state law).
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were sufficient to establish future dangerousness.1" Despite the fact that Green
had no record of prior criminal convictions, the court found that the offense
itself indicated that Green posed a future danger.161 Virginia Code section 19.2-
264.2 states that "a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the court or
juryshall... after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society."1 62 In Gvn, the court failed to make any reference to section 19.2-
264.2.163 The court's failure to recognize, or refusal to consider, the inherent
conflict between sections 19.2-2642 and 19.2-264.4(Q is troublesome.'" Section
19.2-264.4(Q can be read to support the conclusion that a finding of future
dangerousness can be based solely on the circumstances of the offense. 165
Section 19.2-264.2, however, appears to make a prior conviction a predicate to
the future dangerousness inquiry." Counsel representing capital defendants who
have no prior convictions should rely upon section 19.2-264.2 when moving to
strike future dangerousness from the case.16
2. Unizatz A wts
In addition, it is arguable whether the circuit court was correct in allowing
the Commonwealth to present evidence of Green's unadjudicated acts.1" Section
19.2-264.3:2, which controls notice to the defendant of the Commonwealth's
intent to introduce evidence of unadjudicated conduct, is specific. 169 It refers
160. Gw;i 580 S.E.2d at 849; sewWolfe v. Commonwealth, 576 S.E.2d 471, 485 (Va. 2003)
(stating that the defendant's acts were sufficient to support the jury's future dangerousness finding
and that "it is not necessary that [the defendant] have a prior criminal record as a predicate on
which the jury must rely before it can sentence him to death based on future dangerousness").
161. Gmy 580 S.E.2d at 848.
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 192-2642 (Mchie 2000).
163. Gin?; 580 S.E2d at 848-49; S 19.2-264.2.
164. See VA. CODEANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that "death shall not
be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove .. . that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the woasans swm*g t i mwmis of the
offense... that he ou... constitute a continuing serious threat to society" (emphasis added)).
165. Id
166. Se 5 192-2642 (stating that a death sentence shall not be imposed unless the court or
jury finds that the defendant poses a continuing serious threat to society after considering the past
criminal record of the defendant).
167. Id
168. Gw;n 580 S.E2d at 839, 848.
169. See VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:2 (ilchie 2000) (stating that if the Commonwealth
intends to introduce evidence of the defendant's unadjudicaed criminal conduct during the
sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth's attorneyshall give the defense notice in writing of the
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only to "unadjudicated criminal conduct." 7' It is, of course, absurd to assume
that the General Assembly intended that the defendant receive notice of
unadjudicated criminal conduct, but also intended that the Commonwealth can
introduce evidence of unadjudicated non-criminal conduct and need not even
give notice that it intends to do so. Some of the unadjudicated conduct in Gnv
appears not to be criminal conduct (e.g., disruptive behavior in jail, the threat to
rob an ice cream vendor)."' There is no statutorybasis for the admission of this
unadjudicated non-criminal conduct in the Commonwealth's penaltyphase case-
in-chief.
F. Ccnitim c aonn
In CGnix v Qwntuatl," the Supreme Court of Vigina held that
evidence describing the nature of prison life was inadmissible."' The defense
attempted to introduce evidence describing the conditions of prison life in
rebuttal to the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. 4 The court
held that prison life evidence is not mitigation evidence and is therefore inadmis-
sible. 7 ' In Bwm V QmnrJ ,"176 the Supreme Court of Virginia reiterated its
holding in Cerrix and stated that "[elvidence regarding the general nature of
prison life is not relevant... even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future
dangerousness.'r7
These holdings prevent defendants from proffering "prison-life" evidence
to rebut the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. When presenting
evidence concerning the conditions of confinement, defense counsel must be
extremelycareful not to call it "prison-life" evidence. However, there are several
ways in which defense counsel can tryto put essentiallythe same evidence before
the jury.
First, the defense can have an ex-warden or prison official testify as to how
he would classifythe defendant as an inmate. Inmate classifications are based on
an assessment of the risk the inmate poses. Testimony of this kind directly
Commonwealth's intention to do so).
170. Id
171. G,&4 580 S.E.2d at 839.
172. 513 S.E2d 642 (Va. 1999).
173. Chmix, 513 S.E.2d at 653.
174. Id
175. Id
176. 541 S.E2d 872 (Va. 2001).
177. Bum,, 541 S.E.2d at 893. Bums argued that "evidence regaiding the qualiyand structure
of an inmate's life in a maximum securityprison, as well as the prison's safetyand security features,
is relevant evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence that a defendant would 'commit




rebuts the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. Second, the defense
can use its mitigation expert to present evidence regarding confinement condi-
tions."' The Commonwealth will often argue that, based on the defendant's
history and the circumstances of the offense, the jury could draw conclusions
regarding the defendant's behavior in the future. However, the mitigation expert
can testify that the best measure of future prison behavior is past prison behav-
ior. To opine about future prison behavior, however, the expert must take into
account and describe to the jury future conditions of confinement that are at
least as restrictive as past conditions of confinement.
. Pm zhtyReuew
The defect in Virginia's proportionalityreview was repeated in GCwm The
Supreme Court of Virginia reviews capital cases in two instances: (1) mandatory
review of death sentences under Virginia Code section 17.1-313; and (2) discre-
tionary review of cases in which life sentences were imposed."7 9 In the latter
cases, of course, the sentences cannot be and are not reviewed. Consequently,
the court will never see more than a small sample of life sentence cases in which
the offense and the offender are more egregious than they are in the death
sentence case being reviewed. If the Supreme Court of Virginia does not con-
sider all cases in which the death penalty was not imposed, nothing can be done
to address the random application of death sentences. Proportionality review
that only looks at cases in which the death penalty has been imposed is tanta-
mount to a rubber-stamping of death sentences.
V. Qrzuion
Gn demonstrates that absent manifest error or clear abuse of discretion,
the Supreme Court of Virginia will affirm a trial court ruling. Defense counsel
should be aware that the circumstances surrounding a murder can be sufficient
to establish future dangerousness. i0 Gm also illustrates the court's strict
application of procedural default rules."'
Jessie A. Seiden
178. See VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:1 (flchie Supp. 2003) (stating that in a capital case the
court "shall appoint one or more qualified mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and to
assist the defense in the preparation and presentation of information concerning the defendant's
history, character, or mental condion" and that the mental health expert shall be a "psychiatrist,
a cinical psychologist, or an individual with a doctorate degree in dinical psychology").
179. SeVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Mfichie 2003) (stating that "[a] sentence of death ... shall
be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court").
180. G, 580 S.E.2d at 849.
181. I at 841-43.
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